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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

This court has jurisdiction of this Petition for Review pursuant to Article 8, §3 of
the Utah Constitution; Utah Code Ann., §§35A-4-508(8)(a), 78A-4-103, 63G-4-403; and
Rule 14 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Was the Workforce Appeals Board's decision that the Claimant was discharged
without just cause reasonable, rational, and supported by substantial evidence in the
record?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The question of whether the Employer had just cause to discharge the Claimant is
a mixed question of law and fact under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Johnson
v. Department ofEmp't Sec, 882 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). When reviewing
an agency's application of the law to a particular set of facts, the Court gives a degree of
deference to the agency and will uphold the Board's decision so long as the decision is
"within the realm of reasonableness and rationality." EAGALA, Inc. v. Department of
Workforce Servs., 2007 UT App. 43, ^43. The Board's findings will be reversed "only if
the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Drake v. Industrial Comm'n,
939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla of
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evidence . . . though something less than the weight of the evidence." Martinez v. MediaPaymaster Plus/ Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007 UT 42, ^35 (omission
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, this Court will "defer to the
Board's assessment of conflicting evidence." Albertsons, Inc. v. Department of Emp't
Sec, 854 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). It is not the Court's "role to judge the
relative credibility of the witnesses." Id.

"It is the province of the Board, not the

appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be
drawn from the same evidence, it is for the Board to draw the inferences." Id.

STATUTES AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE

The statutes and rules which are determinative in this matter are set forth verbatim
in Addendum A, and include the following:
§35A-4-307(l), Utah Code Annotated
§35A-4-405(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated
§35A-4-508(8)(a), Utah Code Annotated
§63G-4-403, Utah Code Annotated
§78A-4-103, Utah Code Annotated
R994-405-202, Utah Administrative Code

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below.
This is an appeal from an unemployment compensation decision by the Workforce

Appeals Board (Board) of the Department of Workforce Services (Department).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Claimant filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits after the
Employer terminated his employment. The Department issued a decision finding the
Claimant had been discharged from his employment with just cause and was therefore
ineligible for benefits under the Utah Employment Security Act, Code Ann. §35A-4405(2)(a).

(All Utah Code provisions are found sequentially at Addendum A,

Department decisions at Addendum B.) The Employer was relieved of benefit charges
under Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-307.
The Claimant appealed the Department decision to an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ). After an evidentiary hearing at which both the Claimant and the Employer were
present, the ALJ determined the Employer failed to meet its burden to prove it discharged
the Claimant for just cause under Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-405(2), thereby reversing the
Department's decision and making the Claimant eligible for benefits. (Addendum C)
The Employer appealed the decision to the Workforce Appeals Board. The majority of
the Board upheld the decision of the ALJ. (Addendum D) The present petition for
review ensued.
B.

Statement of the Facts.
The Board supplements and corrects the Employer's Statement of the Facts as

follows:
The Claimant worked as a sales representative for the Employer from March 1,
2010, until he was discharged on May 14, 2010. (Record, 042: 10-25). The Claimant
worked on a commission-only basis. (R, 043: 3-6). The Claimant received a schedule
when he first started work that was designed to maximize client contact opportunities.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(R, 063: 3-7). As a skilled sales representative working on a commission-only basis, the
Claimant felt this schedule was a suggested schedule and he was free to deviate from the
schedule in order to set appointments and meet client needs. (R, 049: 16-18; 055: 5; 58:
21-24; 068: 19-25; 069: 17-23).
The Claimant often saw other employees, including his team leader, deviate from
their schedules, often without discussing the matter with a supervisor. (R, 058: 29-31;
066: 23-29). The Claimant often left early or arrived late, yet still worked more than 46
hours each week, which was more than the number of hours he was expected to work.
(R, 042: 35-41). The Employer found the Claimant to be a very skilled salesman and
often considered him an asset to the sales team. (R, 055: 5-23).
The Employer was bothered by the Claimant's attendance. Despite "several verbal
warnings," however, the Employer took no concrete action with the Claimant until it
issued a written warning on April 12, 2010. (R, 048: 25-32). The Claimant was late on
that day as he was carpooling with a coworker. (R, 061: 30-41). The Claimant missed an
appointment with a potential customer that was originally scheduled for 9:00 a.m. (Id.).
The Claimant remedied the problem, however, contacting the customer as soon as he
arrived at work. (Id.).
The Employer issued a written warning on April 12, 2010, describing the
Employer's concern over the missed appointment and outlining the schedule the
Employer expected the Claimant to work. (R, 009). There is no indication in the record
the Claimant missed a scheduled appointment after April 12.
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The Claimant continued to feel the Employer's schedule was a suggested schedule
and he was free to deviate from the schedule. (R, 063: 3-7; 068: 19-25, 39-44; 069: 1-12,
17-23). Despite the language contained in the written warning, the Claimant never
believed his job was in jeopardy as he felt he was meeting the Employer's expectations
and doing his best. (R, 064: 40-43; 065: 1-8; 068: 19-25, 39-44; 069: 1-12, 17-23).
The Claimant still did not adhere to the schedule issued by the Employer after
April 12, continuing to come and go as he wished. (R, 008). He was late on April 26.
{Id.). The Employer did not issue another warning or otherwise discipline the Claimant
after this incident. The Claimant was late on May 7. {Id.; R, 045: 41-42). Again, the
Employer did not issue another warning or otherwise discipline the Claimant.

The

Employer claimed the Claimant failed to report to work and did not contact his supervisor
regarding his failure to report on May 10. (R, 008; 045: 12-22). The Employer provided
little detail about the Claimant's no call/no show on May 10, but failed to issue another
warning or otherwise discipline the Claimant. The Claimant was late for work again on
May 11. (R, 008; 044: 19-25). Again, the Employer took no action. Finally, the
Claimant left work early on May 13. (R, 008; 043: 23-27). The Employer discharged
him the following day.
When the Employer discharged the Claimant, it did not tell the Claimant he was
being discharged for attendance issues, citing instead the Claimant's attitude,
argumentative nature, and communication problems. (R, 069: 28-40; 070: 9-15, 21-30).
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5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The Board correctly determined the Employer discharged the Claimant without
just cause based on the substantial evidence in the record. Because the Employer failed
to establish just cause to discharge the Claimant, the Claimant is eligible for benefits.
The Employer failed to establish its legitimate interests were threatened by the Claimant's
attendance, the Claimant knew he was expected to strictly adhere to the work schedule
the Employer had given to him, or he had the requisite control over the actions that led to
his eventual discharge. The Board's decision to allow benefits is reasonable and rational.
It is supported by substantial evidence in the record and this Court should deny the
Employer's appeal.
On appeal to this Court, the Employer argues it satisfied the necessary elements to
establish just cause. The Employer argues the Claimant's attendance was sufficiently
culpable, the Claimant knew he was expected to work his assigned schedule, and it was
within his control to do so. The Employer, however, failed to show how the Claimant's
actions damaged or threatened its legitimate interests, that the Claimant knew his actions
were contrary to the Employer's expectations, that he could have anticipated negative
consequences would result from his actions, or that he could have anticipated the
Employer would suddenly find his conduct so objectionable it would lead to his
immediate discharge.
The Employer also failed to marshal the evidence to show the Board's decision is
not supported by substantial evidence, marshaling only the evidence supporting its
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6

contention the Claimant was discharged for just cause and ignoring any evidence contrary
to its desired outcome.

ARGUMENT
I. THE BOARD'S DECISION THAT THE EMPLOYER
DISHARGED THE CLAIMANT WITHOUT JUST CAUSE
WAS REASONABLE AND RATIONAL AND SHOULD BE
UPHELD.

The Employer argues on appeal that it established just cause for the Claimant's
discharge in that it discharged the Claimant for failing to adhere to his schedule. The
Employer argues the Claimant's attendance problem, absent any significant harm or
threat of significant harm, is sufficient to establish the element of culpability.

The

Employer also argues the Claimant knew the Employer expected him to work the
assigned schedule and it was in his control to do so.
A claimant is eligible for unemployment benefits if discharged without just case as
defined in Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202.

{See Addendum A).

In establishing

whether a claimant was discharged for just cause, the employer has the burden of
proving: (1) the claimant's culpability, (2) the claimant's knowledge of expected conduct,
and (3) that the offending conduct was within the claimant's control. See Bhatia v.
Department of Employment Sec, 834 P.2d 574, 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The employer
must establish each of the three elements in order for the claimant to be denied benefits.
Id., at 577.
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Here, the majority of the Board found the Employer failed to prove any of the
elements necessary to establish just cause. While discharged for not strictly adhering to
the Employer's work schedule, the Claimant still worked more hours than he was
expected to work each week. There is also no indication the Claimant's conduct resulted
in lost clients, lost revenue for the Employer, or missed opportunities to meet with clients
or customers. There is no indication the Claimant's conduct undermined the Employer's
authority or affected its ability to maintain discipline in the workplace. Indeed, it is not
clear how the Employer was damaged other than the Claimant's supervisor did not always
know where he was. Further, the Claimant did not understand the work schedule to be
anything other than a suggested schedule designed to maximize customer contact
opportunities. He saw other employees come and go as they pleased and had been
allowed to do so for most of his time with the Employer. As such, he was not in control
of the fact the Employer would suddenly find this conduct objectionable.
A. The Employer Failed to Establish the Element of Culpability
In order to demonstrate the element of culpability, the Employer must show the
conduct causing the discharge to be so serious that continuing the employment
relationship would jeopardize its legitimate interests. Utah Admin. Code R994-405202(1). Here, the Employer failed to establish the Claimant's conduct was so serious it
jeopardized the Employer's legitimate interests. The ALJ and Board found the Employer
failed to show how the Claimant's actions actually threatened the Employer's rightful
interests. The Board further found that as a commission-only employee, and as an
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experienced salesman, the Claimant was entitled to a little latitude in his schedule in
order to better meet client needs and to maximize his personal income.
The Employer argues on appeal the Claimant's refusal to strictly adhere to his
work schedule is sufficiently culpable. The Employer again fails to articulate exactly
how the Claimant's conduct threatened its interests, but argues the rules governing
unemployment benefits make it clear the Claimant's attendance was sufficiently
problematic to suffice as culpable conduct.

The Employer cites a number of Utah

Administrative Code provisions for the premise the Claimant's attendance problems, by
themselves, are sufficiently culpable to justify its decision to discharge the Claimant.
This case, however, is not about whether the provisions of the administrative code
can be applied to the Claimant. Rather, this case is about culpability. The unique pay
structure in this case, coupled with the Claimant's obligation to meet with clients based
on their schedule and the Employer's failure to identify how the Claimant's actions
actually threatened its legitimate interests led the majority of the Board to conclude the
Claimant's conduct was simply not culpable.
The Employer failed to specify how its legitimate interests were threatened by the
Claimant's conduct. The Employer testified briefly as to how the Claimant's actions
could have damaged the Claimant's interests, but there is no indication in the record the
Claimant's conduct actually did or potentially could have threatened the Employer's
interests. Speaking of its employees in general, the Employer speculated that "[wjhen
they're not here at work obviously they're not able to contact the clients that they've given
charge over, and thus would lead to a lack of revenue . . . and sales for the organization."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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(R, 048: 10-15). Aside from the missed appointment on April 125 the Employer did not
testify the Claimant's actions actually resulted in the Claimant failing to contact clients or
a loss of revenue for the Employer, just that the Claimants conduct could potentially
result in such consequences.
There is also no indication in the record the Claimant's conduct resulted in poor
performance or caused him not to meet his sales requirements. Rather, the Employer
testified the Claimant was a "skilled salesman" and was often, though not always, an
asset to his sales team. (R, 055: 5, 23).
Likewise, the Employer also testified the Claimant's conduct led "obviously to a
lack of trust from Employer to employee." (R, 048: 19). Again, given that the Employer
failed to articulate how the Claimant's conduct threatened its interests, it is not clear how
the Claimant's conduct could have led to a loss of trust.
The Employer argues on appeal the Claimant's conduct led to disciplinary
problems and undermined the Employer's authority. While the Employer was no doubt
frustrated with the Claimant, there is no indication in the record that the Claimant's
conduct led to disciplinary problems or undermined the Employer's authority.

The

Employer failed to provide testimony that the Claimant's conduct resulted in attendance
problems for other sales representatives. The Employer also failed to provide testimony
the Claimant's conduct undermined its authority other than the Claimant was not always
at work exactly when the Employer wanted him to be.
Indeed, the Employer was unable to identify any specific examples of harm caused
by the Claimant's attendance problems.

See RKB Industrial, Inc., v. Department of
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Workforce Servs., 2003 UT App 180, *4 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (employer was unable to
establish element of culpability as it was "unable to document a single example of harm"
caused by claimant's tardiness).

Moreover, in Whipple v. Department of Workforce

Servs., 2004 UT App 479 (Utah Ct. App. 2004), the Court agreed with the Department's
determination that tardiness alone was insufficient to establish culpability as the
employer had tolerated, reluctantly, the claimant's refusal to follow the employer's
attendance policy. Id. at *4. The claimant in Whipple had been discharged after her
repeated refusal to adhere to a specific work schedule led to morale problems with other
employees. The Court upheld the Department's determination the Claimant's culpability
arose from her flaunting of the attendance policy, which disrupted the workplace and
resulted in morale problems for other employees. Id. There is no indication in the
present case that the Claimant's conduct caused disruptions in the workplace or affected
the morale of his coworkers.
Despite the Claimant's attendance issues, he still averaged more than 46 hours
each week. (R, 042: 36). The majority of the Board found the Claimant was entitled to
some latitude in his schedule, particularly in light of the hours the Claimant worked each
week and in light of the unique pay structure in this instance; the Claimant was paid
solely on commissions. The Employer argues for the first time on appeal the Employer
was required to pay the difference between any commissions earned and minimum wage
should the Claimant fail to make minimum wage through his commissions. There is,
however, no indication in the record the Claimant ever failed to make at least minimum
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wage through his commissions or the Employer was ever forced to make up that
difference.
Inasmuch as the Claimant was responsible for maximizing his personal income,
which would in turn maximize the revenue realized by the Employer, the majority of the
Board found the Claimant was entitled to manipulate his schedule in order to meet client
needs and to maximize revenue.

The Board's finding that the Employer failed to

establish the element of culpability was reasonable, rational, and supported by substantial
evidence.
B. The Employer Failed to Establish the Element of Knowledge
In order to establish the element of knowledge, the Employer must show the
Claimant understood the conduct the Employer expected. Utah Admin. Code R994-405202(2). The Employer must also show the Claimant should have been able to anticipate
the negative effect of his conduct. Id.
Here, the Employer failed to show the Claimant understood he was expected to
strictly adhere to the work schedule outlined by the Employer. The ALJ and Board found
the Claimant provided credible testimony he thought the schedule was a suggestion, he
thought he was meeting the Employer's expectations, and he could not have anticipated
the negative consequences that would result from his conduct. The Board's decision was
reasonable, rational, and supported by substantial evidence in the record.
The Employer argues on appeal the warning issued on April 12 was sufficient to
establish the element of knowledge and the Claimant was discharged for his failure to
strictly adhere to the schedule as outlined by the Employer when the Claimant was first
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law12
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hired and as detailed in the April 12 warning. The Claimant, however, testified he saw
other sales representatives come and go at their discretion. (R, 058: 29-42; 066: 23-29).
The Claimant also testified the schedule was presented to him as a schedule that other
teams had experienced success with and one the Employer would like all sales
representatives to utilize. (R, 063: 3-5). He also testified that it was his understanding
there was not a set schedule because of the commission-only structure of the job and that
he had the flexibility to schedule meetings with clients outside of the schedule outlined
by the Employer. (R, 063: 6-7; 068: 19-25; 069: 17-23). The Claimant also testified he
never thought his job was in jeopardy, was surprised when he was discharged, and
thought he was meeting the Employer's expectations. (R, 064: 40-43; 065: 1-4; 068: 1925; 058: 23-24).
The Employer was never satisfied with the Claimant's attendance, testifying that it
issued several verbal warnings and expressed its dissatisfaction through email messages.
(R, 048: 25-36). Despite its dissatisfaction, the Employer did not issue a warning until
April 12. Further, even though the Claimant's attendance and conduct did not improve
after April 12, the Employer took no further action until it suddenly decided to discharge
the Claimant on May 14. This, coupled with the Claimant's testimony, led the majority
of the Board to determine the Employer had condoned the Claimant's behavior, even if it
did so reluctantly.
The Employer also condoned an atmosphere in which work schedules were not
strictly adhered to, with employees coming and going as they pleased. (R, 058: 29-42;
066: 23-29). The Claimant had been allowed to alter his schedule repeatedly without
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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repercussion. He also saw other employees engaged in similar conduct. The Claimant
also believed the schedule was a suggested schedule intended to maximize client contact
and thought he was meeting the Employer's expectations by working more than 40 hours
each week. As such, he could not possibly have anticipated that the Employer would
suddenly find his conduct so egregious that it necessitated his immediate discharge.
The Board's determination that the Employer failed to establish the element of
knowledge was reasonable, rational, and supported by substantial evidence in the record.
C. The Employer Failed to Establish the Element of Control
In order to establish the element of control, the Employer must show the conduct
causing the discharge was within the Claimant's control. Utah Admin. Code R994-405202(3)(a). The Employer argues on appeal neither the ALJ nor the Board addressed the
issue of control on appeal and that it was within the Claimant's control to adhere to the
work schedule and to notify his supervisor if he needed to deviate from his schedule. The
Employer, however, misreads the Board's decision. The majority of the Board found
absent a clear understanding of the Employer's expectations, the Claimant could not
possibly have conformed his conduct to meet the Employer's expectations.
The Employer failed to establish the element of knowledge.

The element of

knowledge must be established in order to establish the element of control. The Claimant
testified he thought he was meeting the Employer's expectations, he never thought his job
was in jeopardy, and he was surprised when he was discharged. (R, 068: 19-25; 058: 2324; 064: 40-43; 065: 1-4).

He also testified he saw coworkers behave in a similar

manner, that the schedule was presented to him as a suggestion, and as a commissionDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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only employee charged with sales he had the flexibility to alter his schedule to meet
client demands. (R, 058: 29-42; 066: 23-29; 063: 3-7; 068: 19-25; 069: 17-23). The
Employer also testified it had long been dissatisfied with the Claimant's attendance but
had issued only verbal and email warnings. It also failed to take any action after issuing
the April 12 warning even though the Claimant's conduct did not improve.
The Employer tolerated the Claimant's poor attendance from the beginning of his
employment.

The Claimant saw coworkers come and go as they pleased. He also

thought the schedule as outlined by the Employer was a suggestion and he could alter his
schedule when necessary. He also felt he was meeting the Employer's expectations. The
Employer failed to demonstrate he should have known he was not meeting its
expectations or he should have been able to anticipate the negative consequences that
would result from his continued conduct. Inasmuch as the Claimant did not understand
he was acting contrary to the Employer's expectation, he could not have altered his
conduct to avoid being discharged. The Board's decision that the Employer failed to
establish the element of control was reasonable, rational, and supported by substantial
evidence.
II.

THE EMPLOYER FAILED TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE
IN SUPPORT OF ITS APPEAL,

In finding the Employer failed to sustain its burden of proving the Claimant was
terminated for just cause, the Board relied on the provisions of the Employment Security
Act, the Utah Rules of Evidence, and case law. In order to successfully challenge this
finding, the Employer "must demonstrate that the findings are not supported by
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substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The Court
should reject the Employer's appeal for its failure to marshal the evidence in support of its
conclusion the findings were without foundation. The burden is an extremely heavy one
and the Employer has presented no evidence or arguments sufficient to overcome this
burden.
In Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), this Court refused to
entertain the appellant's factual challenges since the appellant failed to meet its
marshaling burden:
[The Appellant] has neither marshaled the evidence in support of the
finding nor demonstrated that the finding is clearly erroneous, but instead
cites only evidence that supports the outcome she desires. See Crookston
v. Fire Ins. Exck, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991) (citing only evidence
favorable to one's position "does not begin to meet the marshaling burden.
. . ."). We therefore assume that the record supports the finding of the
trial court. Id. at 820. [Emphasis added]
This Court expanded upon the appellant's burden to marshal the evidence in
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah Ct. App.
1994):
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual findings lightly. We
repeatedly have set forth the heavy burden appellants must bear when
challenging factual findings. Id. at 1042.
The Court reasoned that to successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact,
"appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. '[Parties] must extricate [themselves]
from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position.'" Id. at 1053, citing West
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Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). The Court
further explained that proper marshaling requires the challenger to:
. . . present in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings
the appellant resists. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d
1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991); accord In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d
885, 886 (Utah 1989); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987);
Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah App. 1993);
Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1993).
Oneida at 1053.
Then, after an appellant has established:
. . . every pillar supporting their adversary's position, they then "must
ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence" and show why those pillars fail to
support the trial court's findings. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1314.
They must show the trial court's findings are "so lacking in support as to
be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly
erroneous.'" Barttell, 776 P.2d at 886 (quoting Walker, 743 P.2d at 193).
Oneida at 1053.
The Employer here has not met its marshaling burden.

It has pointed to no

evidence in the record to show that the findings of the Board are so "against the clear
weight of the evidence" that they are "clearly erroneous." The record below is supported
by the evidence and entitled to a presumption of validity. See also Grace Drilling Co. v.
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), where this court held:
. . . the 'whole record test' necessarily requires that a party challenging the
Board's findings of fact must marshall all of the evidence supporting the
findings and show that despite the . . . contradictory evidence, the findings
are not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 67-68.
In the recent unemployment case of Target Interact US, LLC v. Workforce
Appeals Bd., 2010 UT App 255 this court noted the employer failed to marshal the
evidence on appeal stating:
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we note that Target's briefing is deficient in several respects and that these
defects alone would be grounds for this court to decline to disturb the
Board's decision. Of particular concern is Target's failure to marshal the
evidence in support of the Board's decision. See generally Martinez v.
Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007
UT 42, P 17, 164 P.3d 384 & n.3, 2007 UT 42, 164 P.3d 384 ("To
successfully challenge an agency's factual findings, the party must
marshall [sic] all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that
despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory
evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence."
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Target's
central disagreement with the Board's decision is factual, and Target's
failure to marshal the evidence in support of the Board's decision
impermissibly shifts the burden of combing the record for supporting
evidence onto this court.
In a separate concurring opinion in Target, Judge Voros wrote:
I concur in the result and in that portion of the memorandum
decision concluding that Target's briefing does not satisfy the
requirements of rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. While
I agree that Target's claims of error lack merit, I would affirm on the
ground that they are inadequately briefed.
The Employer in this case also failed to meet its marshaling burden.

CONCLUSION

The Court should find the substantial evidence in the record supports the Board's
determination the Claimant was discharged without just cause and therefore is eligible
for benefits. The Employer failed to establish the elements of culpability, knowledge,
and control. It also failed to marshal the evidence in support of its appeal. The Board's
decision was reasonable and rational. As such, the Board requests the Court deny the
Employer's appeal and affirm the Board's decision.
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35A-4-307.
(1)

Social costs — Relief of charges.
Social costs shall consist of those benefit costs defined as follows:

(a)
Benefit costs of an individual will not be charged to a base-period
employer, but will be considered social costs if the individual's separation from
that employer occurred under any of the following circumstances:
(i)
the individual was discharged by the employer or voluntarily quit
employment with the employer for disqualifying reasons, but subsequently
requalified for benefits and actually received benefits;
(ii)
the individual received benefits following a quit which was not
attributable to the employer;
(iii) the individual received benefits following a discharge for
nonperformance due to medical reasons; or
(iv) the individual received benefits while attending the first week of
mandatory apprenticeship training.
(b)
Social costs are benefit costs which are or have been charged to
employers who have terminated coverage and are no longer liable for
contributions, less the amount of contributions paid by such employers during the
same time period.
(c)
The difference between the benefit charges of all employers whose
benefit ratio exceeds the maximum overall contribution rate and the amount
determined by multiplying the taxable payroll of the same employers by the
maximum overall contribution rate is a social cost.
(d)
Benefit costs attributable to a concurrent base-period employer will
not be charged to that employer if the individual's customary hours of work for
that employer have not been reduced.
(e)
Benefit costs incurred during the course of division-approved
training which occurs after December 31,1985, will not be charged to base-period
employers.
(f)
Benefit costs will not be charged to employers if such costs are
attributable to:
(i)

the state's share of extended benefits;
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(ii)

uncollectible benefit overpayments;

(iii) the proportion of benefit costs of combined wage claims that are
chargeable to Utah employers and are insufficient when separately considered for
a monetary eligible claim under Utah law and which have been transferred to a
paying state; and
(iv) benefit costs attributable to wages used in a previous benefit year
that are available for a second benefit year under Subsection 35-4-401 (2) because
of a change in method of computing base-periods, overlapping base-periods, or
for other reasons required by law.
(g)
Any benefit costs that are not charged to an employer and not
defined in this subsection are also social costs.
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35A-4-405.

Ineligibility for benefits.

Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (5), an individual is ineligible for
benefits or for purposes of establishing a waiting period:
(1 )(a) For the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without good
cause, if so found by the division, and for each week thereafter until the claimant has
performed services in bona fide, covered employment and earned wages for those
services equal to at least six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount.
(b)
A claimant may not be denied eligibility for benefits if the claimant
leaves work under circumstances where it would be contrary to equity and good
conscience to impose a disqualification.
(c)
Using available information from employers and the claimant, the
division shall consider for the purposes of this chapter the reasonableness of the
claimant's actions, and the extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing
attachment to the labor market in reaching a determination of whether the
ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and good conscience.
(d)
Notwithstanding any other subsection of this section, a claimant who
has left work voluntarily to accompany, follow, or join the claimant's spouse to or in
a new locality does so without good cause for purposes of Subsection (1).
(2)(a) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for just cause or
for an act or omission in connection with employment, not constituting a crime,
which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest,
if so found by the division, and thereafter until the claimant has earned an amount
equal to at least six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered
employment.
(b)
For the week in which the claimant was discharged for dishonesty
constituting a crime or any felony or class A misdemeanor in connection with the
claimant's work as shown by the facts, together with the claimant's admission, or as
shown by the claimant's conviction of that crime in a court of competent jurisdiction
and for the 51 next following weeks.
(c)
Wage credits shall be deleted from the claimant's base period, and are
not available for this or any subsequent claim for benefits.
(3)(a)(i) If the division finds that the claimant has failed without good cause
to properly apply for available suitable work, to accept a referral to suitable work
offered by the employment office, or to accept suitable work offered by an employer
or the employment office.
(ii)
The ineligibility continues until the claimant has performed services
in bona fide covered employment and earned wages for the services in an amount
equal to at least six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount.
(b)(i) A claimant may not be denied eligibility for benefits for failure to
apply, accept referral, or accept available suitable work under circumstances where
it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a disqualification.
(ii)
The division shall consider the purposes of this chapter, the
reasonableness of the claimant's actions, and the extent to which the actions evidence
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a genuine continuing attachment to the labor market in reaching a determination of
whether the ineligibility of the claimant is contrary to equity and good conscience.
(c)
In determining whether work is suitable for an individual, the division
shall consider the:
(i)

degree of risk involved to his health, safety, and morals;

(ii)

individual's physical fitness and prior training;

(iii)

individual's prior earnings and experience;

(iv)

individual's length of unemployment;

(v)

prospects for securing local work in his customary occupation;

(vi)

wages for similar work in the locality; and

(vii)

distance of the available work from his residence.

(d)
Prior earnings shall be considered on the basis of all four quarters used
in establishing eligibility and not just the earnings from the most recent employer.
The division shall be more prone to find work as suitable the longer the claimant has
been unemployed and the less likely the prospects are to secure local work in his
customary occupation.
(e)
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no work is
suitable, and benefits may not be denied under this chapter to any otherwise eligible
individual for refusing to accept new work under any of the following conditions:
(i)
if the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or
other labor dispute;
(ii)
if the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are
substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work
in the locality; or
(iii)
if as a condition of being employed the individual would be required
to join a company union or to resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor
organization.
(4)
For any week in which the division finds that the claimant's
unemployment is due to a stoppage of work that exists because of a strike involving
the claimant's grade, class, or group of workers at the factory or establishment at
which the claimant is or was last employed.
(a)
If the division finds that a strike has been fomented by a worker of any
employer, none of the workers of the grade, class, or group of workers of the
individual who is found to be a party to the plan, or agreement to foment a strike,
shall be eligible for benefits. However, if the division finds that the strike is caused
by the failure or refusal of any employer to conform to any law of the state or of the
United States pertaining to hours, wages, or other conditions of work, the strike may
not render the workers ineligible for benefits.
(b)

If the division finds that the employer, the employer's agent or
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representative has conspired, planned, or agreed with any of the employer's workers,
their agents or representatives to foment a strike, that strike may not render the
workers ineligible for benefits.
(c)
A worker may receive benefits if, subsequent to the worker's
unemployment because of a strike as defined in Subsection (4), the worker has
obtained employment and has been paid wages of not less than the amount specified
in Subsection 35A-4-401(4) and has worked as specified in Subsection 35A-4403(l)(f). During the existence of the stoppage of work due to this strike the wages
of the worker used for the determination of his benefit rights may not include any
wages the worker earned from the employer involved in the strike.
(5)(a) For each week with respect to which the claimant willfully made a
false statement or representation or knowingly failed to report a material fact to
obtain any benefit under the provisions of this chapter, and an additional 13 weeks
for the first week the statement or representation was made or fact withheld and six
weeks for each week thereafter; the additional weeks not to exceed 49 weeks.
(b)
The additional period shall commence on the Sunday following the
issuance of a determination finding the claimant in violation of this Subsection (5).
(c)(i) Each individual found in violation of this Subsection (5) shall repay
to the division the overpayment and, as a civil penalty, an amount equal to the
overpayment.
(ii)
The overpayment is the amount of benefits the claimant received by
direct reason of fraud.
(iii)
chapter.

The penalty amount shall be regarded as any other penalty under this

(iv)
These amounts shall be collectible by civil action or warrant in the
manner provided in Subsections 35A-4-305(3) and (5).
(d)
A claimant is ineligible for future benefits or waiting week credit, and
any wage credits earned by the claimant shall be unavailable for purposes of paying
benefits, if any amount owed under this Subsection (5) remains unpaid.
(e)
Determinations under this Subsection (5) shall be appealable in the
manner provided by this chapter for appeals from other benefit determinations.
(f)
If the fraud determination is based solely on unreported or under
reported work or earnings, or both, and the claimant would have been eligible for
benefits if the work or earnings, or both, had been correctly reported, the individual
does not lose eligibility because of the misreporting but is liable for the overpayment
and the penalties in Subsection (5)(c).
(6)
For any week with respect to which or a part of which the claimant
has received or is seeking unemployment benefits under an unemployment
compensation law of another state or the United States. If the appropriate agency of
the other state or of the United States finally determines that the claimant is not
entitled to those unemployment benefits, this disqualification does not apply.
(7)(a) For any week with respect to which the claimant is receiving, has
received, or is entitled to receive remuneration in the form of:
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(i)

wages in lieu of notice, or a dismissal or separation payment; or

(ii)

accrued vacation or terminal leave payment.

(b)
If the remuneration is less than the benefits that would otherwise be
due, the claimant is entitled to receive for that week, if otherwise eligible, benefits
reduced as provided in Subsection 35A-4-401(3).
(8)(a) For any week in which the individual's benefits are based on service
for an educational institution in an instructional, research, or principal administrative
capacity and that begins during the period between two successive academic years,
or during a similar period between two regular terms, whether or not successive, or
during a period of paid sabbatical leave provided for in the individual's contract if the
individual performs services in the first of those academic years or terms and if there
is a contract or reasonable assurance that the individual will perform services in that
capacity for an educational institution in the second of the academic years or terms.
(b)(1) For any week in which the individual's benefits are based on service
in any other capacity for an educational institution, and that week begins during a
period between two successive academic years or terms if the individual performs
those services in the first of the academic years or terms and there is a reasonable
assurance that the individual will perform the services in the second of the academic
years or terms.
(ii)
If compensation is denied to any individual under this Subsection (8)
and the individual was not offered an opportunity to perform the services for the
educational institution for the second of the academic years or terms, the individual
shall be entitled to a retroactive payment of compensation for each week for which
the individual filed a timely claim for compensation and for which compensation was
denied solely by reason of this Subsection (8).
(c)
With respect to any services described in Subsection (8)(a) or (b),
compensation payable on the basis of those services shall be denied to an individual
for any week that commences during an established and customary vacation period
or holiday recess if the individual performs the services in the period immediately
before the vacation period or holiday recess, and there is a reasonable assurance that
the individual will perform the services in the period immediately following the
vacation period or holiday recess.
(d)(i) With respect to services described in Subsection (8)(a) or (b),
compensation payable on the basis of those services as provided in Subsection (8)(a),
(b), or (c) shall be denied to an individual who performed those services in an
education institution while in the employ of an educational service agency.
(ii)
For purposes of Subsection (8)(d), "educational service agency" means
a governmental agency or entity established and operated exclusively for the purpose
of providing the services described in Subsection (8)(a) or (b) to an educational
institution.
(e)
Benefits based on service in employment, defined in Subsections 3 5 A4-204(2)(d) and (e) are payable in the same amount, on the same terms and subject
to the same conditions as compensation payable on the basis of other service subject
to this chapter.
(9)

For any week that commences during the period between two
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successive sport seasons or similar periods if the individual performed any services,
substantially all of which consists of participating in sports or athletic events or
training or preparing to participate in the first of those seasons or similar periods and
there is a reasonable assurance that individual will perform those services in the later
of the seasons or similar periods.
(10)(a) For any week in which the benefits are based upon services
performed by an alien, unless the alien is an individual who has been lawfully
admitted for permanent residence at the time the services were performed, was
lawfully present for purposes of performing the services or, was permanently residing
in the United States under color of law at the time the services were performed,
including an alien who is lawfully present in the United States as a result of the
application of Subsection 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
1182(d)(5)(A).
(b)
Any data or information required of individuals applying for benefits
to determine whether benefits are not payable to them because of their alien status
shall be uniformly required from all applicants for benefits.
(c)
In the case of an individual whose application for benefits would
otherwise be approved, no determination that benefits to the individual are not
payable because of his alien status shall be made except upon a preponderance of the
evidence.
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35A-4-508. Review of decision or determination by division — Administrative law
judge — Division of adjudication — Workforce Appeals Board — Judicial
review by Court of Appeals — Exclusive procedure.
(8)(a) Within 30 days after the decision of the Workforce Appeals Board is issued,
any aggrieved party may secure judicial review by commencing an action in the court of
appeals against the Workforce Appeals Board for the review of its decision, in which action
any other party to the proceeding before the Workforce Appeals Board shall be made a
defendant.
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63G-4-403. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action
with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the
appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional
filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review
of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the
record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record,
it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is
unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process,
or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decisionmaking body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
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78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the
agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board
of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
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R994-405-202. Just Cause.
To establish just cause for a discharge, each of the following three elements
must be satisfied:
(1)

Culpability.

The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If the
conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no expectation it
would be continued or repeated, potential harm may not be shown. The claimant's
prior work record is an important factor in determining whether the conduct was an
isolated incident or a good faith error in judgment. An employer might not be able
to demonstrate that a single violation, even though harmful, would be repeated by a
long-term employee with an established pattern of complying with the employer's
rules In this instance, depending on the seriousness of the conduct, it may not be
necessary for the employer to discharge the claimant to avoid future harm.
(2)

Knowledge.

The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer
expected. There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the
employer; however, it must be shown the claimant should have been able to
anticipate the negative effect of the conduct. Generally, knowledge may not be
established unless the employer gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior or
had a written policy, except in the case of a violation of a universal standard of
conduct. A specific warning is one way to show the claimant had knowledge of the
expected conduct. After a warning the claimant should have been given an
opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. If the employer had a progressive
disciplinary procedure in place at the time of the separation, it generally must have
been followed for knowledge to be established, except in the case of very severe
infractions, including criminal actions.
(3)

Control.

(a)
The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the
claimant's control. Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment
are not sufficient to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued
inefficiency, repeated carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected of a
reasonable person in a similar circumstance may satisfy the element of control if the
claimant had the ability to perform satisfactorily.
(b)
The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it may
be necessary to discharge workers who do not meet performance standards. While
such a circumstance may provide a basis for discharge, this does not mean benefits
will be denied. To satisfy the element of control in cases involving a discharge due
to unsatisfactory work performance, it must be shown the claimant had the ability to
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perform the job duties in a satisfactory manner. In general, if the claimant made a
good faith effort to meet the job requirements but failed to do so due to a lack of skill
or ability and a discharge results, just cause is not established.
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UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANC
DECISION OF ELIGIBILITY FOK
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS

ADD

DCAT

DATE MAILED: 6/8/10 ELECTRONIC

MATT DAVIS
1567S2300E
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84108-2775

lotice:

SSN:

XXX-XX-X361

EMPLOYER: PROSPER TEAM, INC.

This d e c i s i o n is made o n y o u r claim for benefits:

ou were discharged from your job for absenteeism or tardiness after you failed to call in or report to work as scheduled.
ou were discharged from your job for just cause. Your conduct was within your control and was adverse to your employer's
ghtful interests. You had knowledge of your responsibilities to your employer or your employer's expectations and you knew or
lould have known the possible adverse effects of your conduct on your employer.
enefits are denied under Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act beginning May 9, 2010 and ending when
XJ have earned wages in bona fide covered employment equal to at least six times your weekly benefit amount and you are
herwise eligible. To reopen your claim, you can file on-line at jobs.utah.gov or you can call the Claim Center. This reopening will
3 effective as of the week you reopen your claim. You will be notified separately of any other issues on your claim.
IGHT TO APPEAL: If you believe this decision is incorrect, appeal by mail to: Utah Department of Workforce Services, Appeals
ection, PO Box 45244, Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0244, or Fax (801) 526-9242, or online at www.jobs.utah.gov. Your appeal must
5 in writing and must be received or postmarked on or before June 23, 2010. An appeal received or postmarked after June 23,
)10 may be considered if good cause for the late filing can be established. Your appeal must be signed by you or your legal
presentative. MAKE SURE YOUR NAME IS WRITTEN LEGIBLY AND THAT YOU INCLUDE YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY
UMBER AND CURRENT ADDRESS. Also, please state the reason for your appeal. A copy of your appeal will be sent to any
her interested parties. It is very important for you to continue to file your weekly claims while the appeal process is pending. You
ill not be paid for any weeks not filed timely unless you can show good cause for late filing.
TAH CLAIMS CENTER PHONE NUMBERS: S.L.: 526-4400, Ogden: 612-0877, Provo: 375-4067, Out of Area: (888) 848-0688.
EPR. K Hintze

EMP.#: 1000526
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APPEAL DECISION:

CASE NO:

10-A-10679-R

The request to reopen the hearing is granted.
The Department decision is reversed.
The Claimant is allowed unemployment benefits.
The Employer is charged.

CASE HISTORY:
Original Hearing Dates:
June 22 and July 7,2010
Dates of Appeal Decisions:
June 21 and July 7,2010
Requests for Reopening Dated: June 22 and July 13, 2010
Appearances:
Claimant and Employer
Issues to be Decided:
R994-508-117 and R994-508-118 - Failure to Appear
35A-4-405(2)(a) - Discharge
35A-4-307 - Employer Charges
The original Department decision denied unemployment insurance benefits on the grounds the Claimant was
discharged for just cause. That decision also relieved the Employer's benefit ratio account for benefits paid
to the Claimant.
APPEAL RIGHTS: The following decision will become final unless, within 30 days from August 3,
2010, further written appeal is received by the Workforce Appeals Board (PO Box 45244, Salt Lake City,
UT 84145-0244; FAX 801-526-9244; or online at http://wwwjobs.utah.gov/appeals) setting forth the
grounds upon which the appeal is made.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
Failure to Appear
The Claimant received the first Notice of Hearing the day before the hearing was to take place. He did not
understand that he needed to call in at least 24 hours prior to the hearing. On the day of the hearing the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Matt Davis

-2-

10-A-10679-R

Claimant called the Appeals Unit and was told he could request reopening of the hearing. He filed his
request the same day. A new hearing was scheduled for July 7, 2010. The Claimant called prior to the
hearing and provided a telephone number. His phone did not ring on the day of the hearing, but the
Claimant noticed later that he had received a voice mail message from the Administrative Law Judge. He
called the Appeals Unit within ten minutes but he was too late to participate in the hearing. The Claimant
filed a second request to reopen the hearing within the time period allowed.
Separation from Employment
Prior to filing a claim for unemployment benefits effective May 9, 2010, the Claimant worked as a sales
representative for Prosper Team Inc. starting on March 1, 2010. The Claimant worked five or six days a
week and earned a straight commission. He was discharged on May 14, 2010, for attendance problems.
The Employer reviewed its attendance policy on the day of the Claimant's work orientation. The Claimant
did not recall specifics about the attendance policy, but he did understand that he was to call his supervisor
if he was going to be late or absent, and he understood he should work a minimum of 40 hours per week.
The Employer did not provide a copy of the attendance policy for the hearing.
The Claimant's team leader gave all the sales representatives on his team a work schedule that indicated
"higher contact hours'5 or the times that sales reps were most likely to reach potential customers. He said
that another team had tried it and found it to be helpful. The scheduled work times were: Monday 8 a.m.
to 5 p.m., Tuesday through Thursday 12 p.m. to 8 p.m., Friday 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., and Saturday 8:30 a.m. to
2 p.m. The Claimant believed the schedule was a suggested, or recommended, schedule. He did not always
adhere to the schedule because he made appointments at the convenience of his customers. The Claimant
came and went from the office as he saw fit. His work hours averaged 46.36 per week. The Claimant was
aware that other sales reps also came and went from the office at unscheduled times on a regular basis.
On April 12,2010, the Claimant's car was being repaired. He had arranged to car pool with a coworker for
two weeks." On April 12, the coworker was late picking the Claimant up. The Claimant did not call his
supervisor to say he would be late. The Claimant missed an opportunity to speak with a potential customer
at 9 a.m. He called the customer later that day and scheduled an appointment. The Claimant's team leader
gave the Claimant a written warning for being late that day, not calling in, and missing a consultation. The
written warning included the sales reps' schedule and instructed the Claimant to work the schedule and let
his team lead know if he was going to be late or absent. After the Claimant received the warning he made
an effort to meet the Employer's expectations. He still did not understand that the stated schedule was
anything other than a recommendation.
The Employer's records indicate the Claimant did not work on Monday, May 10, The Claimant did not
remember whether he worked that day or not. He may have worked but failed to clock in and out, or the
time clock may have been out of order, which was not unusual On May 11, the Claimant was scheduled
to work at 12 p.m. but did not arrive until 1:05 p.m. because his car would not start and he had to get it to
a friend for help. On May 12/2010, the Claimant worked 9.35 hours. On May 13, the Claimant was
scheduled to work until 8 p.m. but he left at 5:11 p.m., after working 7.37 hours. The Claimant was
discharged on May 14, 2010, for not adhering to the schedule.
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REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Failure to Appear
The unemployment insurance rules pertaining to Section 35A-4-406(3) of the Utah Employment Security
Act provide, in pertinent part:
R994-508-II7.

Failure to Participate in the Hearing and Reopening the Hearing
After the Hearing Has Been Concluded.

(1) If a party fails to appear for or participate in the hearing, either personally or
through a representative, the ALJ may take evidencefromparticipating parties and will issue
a decision based on the best available evidence.
(2) Any party failing to participate, personally or through a representative, may
request that the hearing be reopened.
(3) The request must be in writing, must set forth the reason for the request, and
must be mailed, faxed, or delivered to the Appeals Unit within ten days of the issuance of
the decision issued under Subsection (1)....
R994-508-118.

What Constitutes Grounds to Reopen a Hearing.

(1) The request to reopen will be granted if the party was preventedfromappearing
at the hearing due to circumstances beyond the party's control.
(2) The request may be granted upon such terms as are just for any of the following
reasons; mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the decision
(3) Requests to reopen are remedial in nature and thus must be liberally construed
in favor of providing parties with an opportunity to be heard and present their case. Any
doubt must be resolved in favor of granting reopening.
(4) Excusable neglect is not limited to cases where the failure to act was due to
circumstances beyond the party's control
(5) The ALJ has the discretion to schedule a hearing to determine if a party
requesting reopening satisfied the requirements of this rule or may, after giving the other
parties an opportunity to respond to the request, grant or deny the request on the basis of the
record in the case.
In this case the Administrative Law Judge finds that the facts warrant a reopening of the hearing to allow
all parties the opportunity to be heard, and the failure to participate in the hearing falls within the definition
of excusable neglect.
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Separation from Employment
Unemployment insurance benefits must be denied if the employer had just cause for discharging the
employee. In order to have just cause for discharge pursuant to Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah
Employment Security Act, there must be fault on the part of the'employee involved. The basic factors as
established by the rules pertaining to Section 35A-4-405(2)(a), which are essential for a determination of
ineligibility under the definition of just cause, are:
(a)
Culpability. The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing
the employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interests . . .
(b)
Knowledge. The worker must have had a knowledge of the conduct which the
employer expected . . .
(c)
Control. The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the claimant's
control...
The element of culpability is not established. Although the Claimant did not consistently adhere to the
schedule supplied by his team leader, he nevertheless worked an average of 46.36 hours per week. Further,
the Claimant worked on a straight commission basis. The Claimant's failure to stick to the schedule set
forth by the Employer may have caused some concern for his team leader, but this situation was not so
serious that the Claimant needed to be discharged immediately. The team leader may have thought the stated
schedule would lead to more contacts with clients and more revenue, but the Employer did not show how
it was harmed by the Claimant's occasional adjustment to his work hours.
The element of knowledge is not established. The Claimant followed the Employer's attendance policy as
he understood it. He understood that he was to notify his team leader if he was going to be late or absent,
and he generally did. Even after he received a written warning, the Claimant believed the stated schedule
was more of a recommendation. He continued to see other sales reps, as well as his team lead, come and
go at unscheduled times. He believed that by putting in more than 40 hours of work each week, he was
meeting the Employer's expectations. He did not know his job was in jeopardy and was shocked at his
discharge.
The element of control has not been established. Because the Claimant did not understand that the schedule
was more than a recommendation or suggestion, he could not conform his behavior to avoid his discharge.
Based on a preponderance of the evidence, the Employer has not established any of the three elements of
just cause and benefits are allowed.
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DECISION AND ORDER:
Failure to Appear
The request for reopening of the hearing is allowed in accordance with provisions of Paragraphs R994-508117 and R994-508-118 of the unemployment insurance rules for Section 35A-4-406(3) of the Utah
Employment Security Act.
Separation
The original Department decision denying the payment of unemployment insurance benefits pursuant to
Section 35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act is reversed. Benefits are allowed effective
May 9,2010, and continuing, provided the Claimant is otherwise eligible.
The Employer is not relieved of liability for charges in connection with this claim, as provided by Section
35A-4-307 of the Utah Employment Security Act.

'Rot
Administrative Law Judge
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES
Issued:

August 3, 2010

RS/tc
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MATT DAVIS, CLAIMANT
S.S.A.No.XXX-XX-1361

:
:

Case No. 10-B-01134

PROSPER TEAM, INC.,
EMPLOYER
DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed.
Benefits are allowed.
The Employer is not relieved of benefit charges.
HISTORY OF CASE:
In a decision dated August 3,2010, Case No. 10-A-10679-R, the Administrative Law Judge reversed
the Department decision and allowed unemployment insurance benefits to the Claimant effective
May 9, 2010. The Employer, Prosper Team, Inc., was ineligible for relief of benefit charges in
connection with this claim.
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The Workforce Appeals Board has authority to review the Administrative Law Judge's decision
pursuant to §35A-4-508(4) and (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Utah
Administrative Code (1997) pertaining thereto.
EMPLOYER APPEAL FILED: September 1, 2010.
ISSUES BEFORE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD AND APPLICABLE PROVISIONS
OF UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT:
1.

Did the Employer have just cause for discharging the Claimant pursuant to the provisions of
§35A-4-405(2)(a)?

2.

Is the Employer eligible for relief of charges pursuant to the provisions of §35A-4-307(l)?

FACTUAL FINDINGS:
The Workforce Appeals Board adopts in foil tfefciaetual findings of the Administrative Law Judge.
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REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Claimant worked for the Employer as a sales representative from March 15 2010, until he was
discharged on May 14, 2010. He earned a straight commission. The Claimant received a work
schedule from his team leader which was designed to take advantage of those times when sales
representatives were most likely to reach potential customers. The Claimant believed the schedule
was a recommended schedule and did not always follow the schedule. He made appointments at the
convenience of his customers. He also went to work and left when he saw fit. The Claimant felt this
was appropriate as other sales representatives, including his team leader, often worked different
schedules. Despite this, the Claimant averaged 46.36 hours of work each week.
The Claimant received a written warning for being late on April 12,2010. The Claimant was riding
to work with a coworker and did not contact his supervisor when he was running late. The written
warning included an instruction to work the schedule given to him by his team leader. The Claimant
made an effort to work that schedule but still considered it to be a recommended schedule.
It is not clear whether the Claimant worked on May 10, 2010. The Employer has no record of the
Claimant working on that day and the Claimant does not remember if he worked or not. The
Claimant felt he may have neglected to clock in prior to working that day. The Claimant was late
on May 11 and left early on May 13. The Employer discharged the Claimant on May 14 for failing
to follow the assigned work schedule.
The Administrative Law Judge found that the Employer failed to establish just cause for its decision
to discharge the Claimant. The Administrative Law Judge determined the Claimant felt the schedule
was a recommendation, worked on a commission-only basis, and worked more than 40 hour each
week.
On appeal to the Board the Employer argues it established just cause. The Employer argues the
Claimant knew he was expected to work the assigned schedule and to call his supervisor if he was
going to be late. The Employer also argues it was incorrect for the Claimant to assume he could
come and go at will merely because his supervisor did. The Employer also argues the Claimant was
required to work a specific schedule in order to have a higher success rate and the Employer's
financial interest was jeopardized by the Claimant's refusal to work during the scheduled hours.
Finally, the Employer argues the Claimant knew what was expected of him and had the ability to
comply with those expectations.
The Unemployment Insurance Rules pertaining to §35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment
Security Act provide, in pertinent part:
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R994-405-202. Just Cause.
To establish just cause for a discharge, each of the following three elements
must be satisfied:
(1)

Culpability.

The conduct causing the discharge must be so serious that continuing the
employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest. If the
conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and there was no expectation it
would be continued or repeated, potential harm may not be shown. The claimant's
prior work record is an important factor in determining whether the conduct was an
isolated incident or a good faith error in judgment. An employer might not be able
to demonstrate that a single violation, even though harmful, would be repeated by a
long-term employee with an established pattern of complying with the employer's
rules In this instance, depending on the seriousness of the conduct, it may not be
necessary for the employer to discharge the claimant to avoid future harm.
(2)

Knowledge.

The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer
expected. There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the
employer; however, it must be shown the claimant should have been able to
anticipate the negative effect of the conduct. Generally, knowledge may not be
established unless the employer gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior or
had a written policy, except in the case of a violation of a universal standard of
conduct. A specific warning is one way to show the claimant had knowledge of the
expected conduct. After a warning the claimant should have been given an
opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. If the employer had a progressive
disciplinary procedure in place at the time of the separation, it generally must have
been followed for knowledge to be established, except in the case of very severe
infractions, including criminal actions.
(3)

Control.

(a)
The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the
claimant's control. Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment
are not sufficient to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued
inefficiency, repeated carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected of a
reasonable person in a similar circumstance may satisfy the element of control if the
claimant had the ability to perform satisfactorily.
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(b)
The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it may
be necessary to discharge workers who do not meet performance standards. While
such a circumstance may provide a basis for discharge, this does not mean benefits
will be denied. To satisfy the element of control in cases involving a discharge due
to unsatisfactory work performance, it must be shown the claimant had the ability to
perform the job duties in a satisfactory manner. In general, if the claimant made a
good faith effort to meet the job requirements but failed to do so due to a lack of skill
or ability and a discharge results, just cause is not established.
In order to establish just cause for a discharge, the Employer must satisfy all three elements of the
just cause standard. Here, the Employer failed to satisfy the necessary elements to show just cause.
To establish culpability, the Employer must show the Claimant's conduct was so serious that
continuing their relationship would jeopardize the Employer's rightful interests. The Claimant was
discharged for failing to work his assigned schedule. The Employer argues on appeal that it is
necessary for employees to work a certain schedule to maximize revenue and to maintain consistency
and uniformity. The Employer also argues it is immaterial whether the Claimant worked more than
40 hours each week because he refused to work when the Employer wanted him to work and it was
detrimental to the Employer's interest for the Claimant not to work the assigned schedule. The
Claimant, however, provided credible testimony that he altered his schedule to better meet and serve
clients. As a seasoned sales representative, the Claimant was entitled to a little latitude in adjusting
his schedule to meet with clients. The Claimant also worked more than 40 hours each week and
worked on a commission only basis. While the Employer has an interest in requiring its employees
to work certain schedules, the Claimant's actions were intended to benefit clients and maximize his
personal income. The Employer failed to show how the Claimant's actions actually threatened the
Employer's rightful interests. The Employer also failed to show the Claimant's actions were so
egregious that they necessitated his immediate discharge. The Employer failed to establish the
element of culpability.
To establish the element of knowledge, the Claimant must have an understanding of the conduct
expected by the Employer. The Employer argues on appeal that the Claimant knew he was expected
to work a certain schedule. The Claimant, however, provided credible testimony that he simply did
not understand the assigned schedule was anything other than a recommendation. He also provided
credible testimony he saw other employees and his team leader come and go at will and felt he was
entitled to do the same. The Claimant understood the Employer's expectations to be that he work
more than 40 hours each week and maximize customer contacts. The Claimant felt he was meeting
the Employer's expectations and could not have anticipated the negative consequences of not
adhering to what he believed to be a recommended schedule. The Employer failed to establish the
element of knowledge.
The element of knowledge must be established in order to establish the element of control. Absent
a clear understanding of the Employer's expectations, the Claimant could not alter his actions to meet
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

JUT

Auu&rsuvm

10-B-01134

-5-

XXX-XX-1361
MATT DAVIS

the Employer's expectations and avoid being discharged. The Employer failed to establish the
element of control.
The decision allowing benefits is affirmed. The Board adopts the Administrative Law Judge's
reasoning and conclusions of law in full.
DECISION:
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge allowing unemployment insurance benefits to the
Claimant effective May 9, 2010, under the provisions of §35 A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment
Security Act is affirmed.
The Employer, Prosper Team, Inc., is ineligible for relief of benefit charges in connection with this
claim, as provided by §35A-4-307(l) of the Act.
APPEAL RIGHTS:
Pursuant to §63-46b-13(l)(a) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, you may request
reconsideration of this decision within 20 days from the date this decision is issued. Your request
for reconsideration must be in writing and must state the specific grounds upon which relief is
requested. The request must be filed with the Workforce Appeals Board at 140 East 300 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah, or may be mailed to the Workforce Appeals Board at P.O. Box 45244,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0244. A copy of the request for reconsideration must also be mailed to
each party by the person making the request. If the Workforce Appeals Board does not issue an
order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered
to be denied pursuant to §63-46b-13(3)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. The filing
of a request for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of this order. If a
request for reconsideration is made, the Workforce Appeals Board will issue another decision. This
decision will set forth the rights of further appeal to the Court of Appeals and time limitation for
such an appeal.
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in
writing within 30 days of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the
fifth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board,
Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the proceeding as Respondents. To file
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ
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of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35A-4-508(8) of the Utah Employment
Security Act; §63-46b-l 6 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9
and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
/s/ Thomas Lewis
1st William Shaw
DISSENT:
I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision. The Employer has a legitimate interest in
requiring its employees to work a specific schedule. Employees are generally not allowed to deviate
from assigned schedules and come and go as they see fit. The Employer provided credible testimony
that the Claimant's actions threatened its economic interests and its ability to manage its employees.
I feel the Employer established the element of culpability.
I feel the Employer also established the element of knowledge. While the Claimant may have
initially thought the assigned schedule was a recommendation, there should have been no doubt that
it was a required schedule after receiving the written warning on April 12,2010. The warning makes
it clear the Claimant was expected to work an assigned schedule.
Finally, I also feel the Employer established the element of control. The Claimant should have
understood the Employer expected him to work an assigned schedule and taken steps to ensure he
worked when the Employer expected him to.
Is/ Tiffany Vincent

WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD
Date Issued: September 30, 2010
TV/TL/WS/RS/JM/ddn
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on
this 30th day of September, 2010, by mailing the same, postage
prepaid, United States mail to:
PROSPER TEAM INC
% HUMAN RESOURCES
5072 N 300 W STE240
PROVO UT 84604-5652
MATT DAVIS
2119 KING ST
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84109-1301

fflMfrne/ AY

VA/A^^iny

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

U

Auu&iyuuivi
DWS 05/28/10 9 16:27

p

May-28-2C10 04i9 PM ROSPER INC 8014375927

3/4

2QiO-May-14 15s56 prosper 8019905421

1/2

.if

PROSPER
Jfe»p2$yc<? Counsoilng J&peri
———iWll

Employ* NrtmtfT
[ SupaivIflOf Kuuc

HI 1

i

' J—*-^M^———*—^—

' Otfte of Warning;

Matt Davla

Topic of Wftmirijj;

J M U » Jftwn

5/24/10
fflilft
AdIierEnceyAbiindonmflat. 1

Iftiturc of Vflul.illmi

[

Verbal Warning:
DAt«'

1

\'iiJH^nWaj-iHi?t':

»L>ll'^Fu:«V:ii>n;

DBtK
4/12/20,5/14/10

Date:

1

uhuvior m tho FoJlomnK'-Ari1
Un&atisiaotorv Puribrm.'ifi<v
Mtftt you &W* *#m Mte Or icfctctrt nraltlpto tfoo* urfthottt $fofcf pW * aatflfcaffon to y&u* *up$rv&or; Here
« » m* recent ofiountacet:
4/26/2010 *• You wen? scheduled to w l c At BlOO AMtoutdid not AOliTy your «uporv(for until &32 AM saying
that you wauJd be nt\¥ork "tot about an hour*. You arrivad, without ether notffioattou at 11:17 AM.
B/7/3Q10«You w#e wheeled to start at 8 AM end you dfdntaotityyour supervisor until 9:37 AM. You
5/1D/2010 ~ You watt achedukd to torn 8 AM to 5 PM "but you aid not c*U or notify- your supervisor that you
would ttit* work, f contact^ you at IMS AM to ifrfflfari you of&efloorwecrfnff and you dm not moond
until
S/l 1/20JO - You did not arrive TO your tch*dui*d *hift or 1130 AM until 1:0d PM« You did not natity your
aupftfvlioir thnt you would be that late. Your *uptfvito* li*d to Contact y w about w r i n g in. You told you had
car problems
S/13/2010-yoU abandoned yonr shift randomly® Sill cad did not notify your nupeiviwr or return to wjirk.
Your *oWulcd »Mft 4i until B PM.
Whan you do not vork your entire ahift or notlSryour aupAttlaor appropriately you Ibnityouticlf the ability to
contact moto people and thus limit youmlf, tho ttam, and th* eoipftny or poiwtsd revenue, Trurt in you
,
^rfciugyouryhftduUl»ioattoW£U
,_ . _
m
mm_
<:n ttk Ferloi'iutuiCiY ImBrovamants:
MWflWATIOWBFFftCOTB 3/14/3010.
Cantt^uanow fa M&m to improve/comply immediately! Mlur* to corracc the above actions immedtatftty
may result to fliture diariplmaiy action up to gad ladvifllnftlira '

I Tindersiaiul that tM* cmployoj coubiaiing wporr WlIL bt wtofcwid buoy personal record, *nd Upon r^tjUwt
cinsntitlod brwetvoacopy,

ffm-ployeoi
SUpgtvinor,.
McnagsmenE

3^1

*m

Putt.*

S/ELus:BE

This document cont*ki unpuhlUktd, eonfldmtial and proprtebuy iafonaiitfoa of Prosper In& Wo disclosuroi
dUpUc4C(QR» OH UffC of Wry ponfon Of tho contents <*! these jH&ltrttdM f&t tny pUrpOUft inay btr rwtJe wiihuut
the prior pcpr^siMj v«rttten COJUtMit of Proepc Inc. C 03/09

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ML,

CWS OS/28/10 (I 16:27

May-28-2C10 04-19 PM PROSPER INC 80143^5927

4/4
2/3

2010-May-i4 15:57 p r o s p e r 8019905421

PROSPER
Employee Counseling Report
Employee
Name;

Superior
Name;

Matt Pari*

Date of
Warnings

4/12/10

Jason Brown

Topic of
yarning

Shift Adherence / Job
Abandonment

Nature of Violation.

Verbal Warning:

Written WarufruS

Date:

Suspension:

Date;
4/12/10

Date:

I
L .

—

—,.

•

-•

—

i_

1.1

'

Unsatisfactory Performance, Conduct pr Behavior in t h e Following j
Arcafs); '

I

Matt, you did you not show up for an appointment scheduled at 9 AM on 4/12/2010*
You ilio didn t coll to Inform mc of your tatdina** until 11:30 AM wh^a your scheduled
«bift begin* at S AM» V&U did not inform tng tha$ you would b$ 1&fc« and yaiw y&ur

aohGduled appolntm&at. When you a*e not at work on time and/orfeUto fulfill
scheduled exultations, you Hrait yaui&elf tbe ability to contact/help more people and
limit yourself and the aan'oany of potential
rtyflttte.
r^^..T_. •••

Expected Performance Improvements:

Work your scheduled «bffi of M 8AM-5PM, T-TH I2AM-8PM,fr8AM-4PM and S &30AMIPM. Call ma if you are going to be late or if something somee tip and you wilt not be

able to malre it to worlc or faffiL« «cheduled consultation.
Consequences for failure to improve/comply Immediately; Failure to oorrcct the above
action? immediately may result Inftiturediaciplinary action up to and including
tenaluatlon.
Employee Colmiiieiits;

I understand tHat this employees counseling report will ho retained in my personal
record, and upon request am entitled to receive & copy.

Signatures:;
Employee; /
Supervisor:
Management:

^ l
^?r^CDate:

Thf* dwuraeat contain* UnpuhHshEd, caafideiiiial ted proprietary foformaifan. orProaper fee, No disclosure,
<lwpJ*cfl&>&r Wf, tt*a 6f*ny pprttan ofUM content* or thwrc material* fhx' day fHtpoto jnqy ba nwd* wfthmic
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ANDERSON

I don't have any other questions, Your Honor.

JUDGE

Okay. Thank you. And, Mr. Brown, would you like to offer any testimony about those
requests to reopen?

BROWN

Your Honor, I just say that on both of those occasions w e sat here for 15 minutes waiting
for a response.

JUDGE

Okay. All right. Thank you. All right. We're going to mo\ eon and talk about this job
separation. These next questions will be for Mr. Biown. Mr. Biown, do you agree that
Mr. Davis was hired on March 1st of 2010?

BROWN

I do, Your Honor.

JUDGE

And was his last day of woik May 14th of 2010?

BROWN

It was.

JUDGE

Do you agree that this job separation was a discharge, not a quit or a layoff?

BROWN

That's correct, Your Honor.

JUDGE

Was Mr. Davis a sales rep?

BROWN

Yes.

JUDGE

And weie you his immediate supervisor4'

BROWN

I was. Your Honor.

JUDGE

Okay. And did Mr. Da^ is woik full-time or part-time?

BROWN

Full-time.

JUDGE

Okay. And the peison who filled out die Form 606, that notice of claim filed, she
indicated that he woiked about four - a little more than 46 houis a week. Do you know
how she came up with that number?

BROWN

I'm assuming that's the average of his average clock in times. So we have an automatic
clock in system wheie you clock in. clock out. So I'm assuming that she took, you know,
the a\erage of-

JUDGE

Okay.
7
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BROWN

- how many hours he (inaudible).

JUDGE

Okay.

Thank j^ou. And did Mr. Davis work for 100% commission; a straight

commission basis?
BROWN

Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE

Okay. Mr. Brown, did you participate in the decision to discharge Mr. Davis?

BROWN

I did, Your Honor.

JUDGE

What was the basic reason for the discharge?

BROWN

He failed to adhere to his schedule.

JUDGE

Okay. Was there a final incident, or a last straw that took place shortly before the
discharge?

BROWN

Yes, there was. Your Honor.

JUDGE

Tell me what happened on the final incident?

BROWN

There was a couple on - if you look at Exhibit 8, on the 13th -

JUDGE

Okay.

BROWN
JUDGE
BROWN

- he abandoned his shift Let me pull that up.
- (inaudible). He was supposed to work until 8:00 p.m. that day, and I didn't hear from
him.

JUDGE

I'm -

BROWN

Also on the 11th-

9

JUDGE

Mr. Brown, which day are you talking about?

0

BROWN

That's the 13th.

JUDGE

Okay. We're starting kind of at the bottom of the list there?

BROWN

Yes. Correct.

)
5
7
S

1
2
0
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JUDGE

Okay. 8/13?

BROWN

Yeah. So the 13th of May, Your Honor.

JUDGE

Okay. And on May 13th what happened that day?

BROWN

So he was supposed to work until 8:00 p.m., and he just left without any notification to
me or anybody else. He left at 5:11 p.m., and didn't return to his shift.

JUDGE

Okay. And he was supposed to work until 8:00 p.m.?

BROWN

Correct, Your Honor.

JUDGE

Okay. All right. And what's the Employer's policy about leaving early?

BROWN

You're supposed to just - if you want to leave early, you've got to get approval from your
immediate supervisor.
Okay. All right. And then let's see, I'm looking at Exhibit 8. So let's just back up there
on May 11th. Would you just describe for the record what happened on May 1 lth?

JUDGE
BROWN

Mr. Davis did not arrive to his shift, which was supposed to begin at 11:30 a.rn. He
arrived at about 1:05 in the afternoon, so p.m. And he didn't notify me that that was
going to happen, and so I had to contact him, I believe, via text or cell phone to see where
he was at.

JUDGE

Okay.

BROWN

So he described he had car problems. But I never heard back from him, so I had to
proactively give him the phone call.

JUDGE

Okay. And does the Employer have a policy about tardiness?

BROWN

Yeah. Obviously if you're going to be late, give your immediate supervisor notification
ahead of time or as soon as you can.
Okay. Now - okay. I think you used the word obviously. But how would Mr. Davis
have been made aware of those policies?

JUDGE

BROWN

Oh, that's a great question. Your Honor. So during orientation they're given - they are
given - each and every employee given an attendance and leave policy -

JUDGE

Okay.
9
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BROWN

- and that's in the employee handbook. I believe it's labeled attendance and punctuality.

JUDGE

Okay. And did Mr. Davis - was he required to sign an acknowledgement that he received
the handbook?

BROWN

Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE
BROWN

Okay. And do you have a copy of that signed acknowledgement?
Not in front of me, Your Honor, no.

JUDGE

Okay. All right. Let's back up to May 10th. What happened on May 10th?

BROWN

It says here he was supposed to come into work. He was scheduled to work 8:00 a.m. to
5:00 p.m., but again he did not call or notify me by any other means that he would miss
work. I tried contacting him at 11:35 ami., to remind him of a meeting that was required

JUDGE

Uh-huh.

BROWN

- and it looks like the message was cut off there. But I never heard back, obviously, until
hours after 8:00 a.m., which was the start of his shift, so basically a no call/no show.

JUDGE

Okay. He never came in that day?

BROWN

I'd have to look at the time punches. Your Honor. No. I'm showing on the 10th, Your
Honor, no, he did not come in.

JUDGE

Okay.

BROWN

That's on Exhibit 10.

JUDGE

One moment. Okay. Thank you.

BROWN

You're welcome.

JUDGE

All right. When you called him at 11:35, did he - were you able to speak to him?

BROWN

You Honor, to be honest, I cannot remember. It's been a coupe of months.

JUDGE

Sure. Okay. Thank you. And then on May 7th it looks like he had a start time of 8:00
a.m., and noticed by you at 9:30?
An hour and a half later, correct - an hour and 37 minutes later. And then -

BROWN

10
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BROWN

I don't recall

JUDGE

Okay. Now when Mr. Davis was not at work as scheduled, did that cause some problems
or concerns for the Employer?

BROWN

Most certainly, Your Honor.

JUDGE

Okay.

BROWN

When they're not here at work obviously they're not able to contact the clients that they've
given charge over, and thus would led to a lack of revenue -

JUDGE

Okay.

BROWN

- and sales for the organization.

JUDGE

All right. Any other problems or concerns besides that you just mentioned?

BROWN

Just obviously a lack of trust from Employer to employee.

JUDGE

Okay. All right. Does Prosper have a progressive disciplinary policy?

BROWN

They do not.

JUDGE

Okay. And other than Exhibit 9, which was given out on April 12th, did Mr. Davis ever
receive any other discipline or warnings?

BROWN

Absolutely. He - Your Honor, he got several verbal warnings.

JUDGE

And -

BROWN

I do have emails that I failed to include. But, yes, verbal warnings.

JUDGE

Okay. And were those from you?

BROWN
JUDGE
BROWN
JUDGE

Yes, Your Honor.
Okay. Do you have the dates on any of those documented?
Not with me, Your Honor.
Okay. All right. On May 14th why did you make a decision to terminate Mr. Davis'
employment rather than another written warning, a suspension or some other form of
discipline?
13
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BROWN

A great question. Your Honor. So I felt at that time, especially after speaking with our
counsel with Ms. Susie Young -

JUDGE

Uh-huh.

BROWN

- the head of human resources, that it was just an ongoing behavioral issue that hadn't
been solved; nothing had improved. So at that point I thought it was in die best interest
of Prosper to part ways.

JUDGE

Okay. All right. Now when Mr. Davis was at work as scheduled what was his o\ erall
work performance like?

BROWN

Depending on the day. Fie was fairly posith e emplo} ee. There were times where he was
easily distracted or distracted others.

JUDGE

Okay. Do you believe he had all the skills and ability to do his job correctl} ?

BROWN

Absolutely, Your Honor.

JUDGE

Okay. What could Mr. Davis have done differently that would have preserved his job?

BROWN

Great question, Your Honor. I think primarily it's just keeping in constant contact with
me, his direct supervisor at that time, via phone calls.

JUDGE

Okay.

BROWN

Obviously, just adhering - adhering to his schedule -

JUDGE

Okay.

BROWN

- more than anything else.

JUDGE

Is there anything else about this discharge that you would like me to know, Mr. Brown?

BROWN

No, Your Honor.

JUDGE
ANDERSON

Okay. Thank you. Mr. Anderson, do you have any questions that you would like to ask
Mr. Brown?
Yes,
I have a couple.

JUDGE

Sure.

ANDERSON

If I can draw your attention to Exhibit 9, in that counseling session were there any steps
14
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I'm trying to follow - wait a minute. When you talked about - let's see, Exhibit 18. All
right. Just a couple of questions, Mr. Brown. You - and claiming that we had - would
you say - you did agree that I had the skills necessary to perform the job, correct?
BROWN

You were a very skilled salesman*

CLAIMANT

And you feel that I - you know, with my time that I was there that I was an asset to your
team?

BROWN

Help me to define asset.

CLAIMANT

I mean, I don't know; was I someone that contributed, or do you feel like that I was a
good employee for Prosper, I guess if you'd understand it any clearer than that? Does that
make sense, or no?

BROWN

I'm trying to -

CLAIMANT

Mr. Brown, it's pretty simple. I mean, do 3011 have -1 was on your team. We had very
close communication. You knew which people were putting in the effort and you felt
like were making a really diligent effort to achieve the things as a team (inaudible) as a
team. Do you feel like I was doing that?

BROWN

Not consistently, no. Were there some days? Absolutely. Other days, no.

CLAIMANT

And was -1 mean, did - so that's such a vague answer. Would you say that everybody on
the team was like that?

BROWN

I don't see how that's relevant.

CLAIMANT

Well, you're saying - you're using it as measurement for my dismissal. Wouldn't - if
everybody on the learn would kind of fit in that same category doesn't really seem fair to
single me out; would you say that's correct?

BROWN

Your dismissal is based upon attendance.

CLAIMANT

Right I'm getting at something. I don't want to talk in circles. The attendance part of it,
I was late the day and you said I was gone on the first -1 remember the 10th, and that
these were the main issues. When we talked in that meeting with me, you and Mr.
Wilbur, the way this was communicated to me, would you say that these things were like
very, I guess, detail - or strongly addressed in our meeting as to why I was dismissed?
And before you just say yes, I - would you say that during that meeting it was brought up
from you that you thought I - one of the main reasons was a disagreement of -1 don't
remember the specifics because there really wasn't any of what - of me taking criticism
from you. That's what I remember you telling me why I wras being let go.
20
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JUDGE

- you left early?

CLAIMANT

Yeah. But he wasn't there, so it really wasn't -1 - you know, he was gone. And I had to
leave for a family emergency, which we did talk about later. But, you know, that was
common practice within the company - or with people there because people came and left
quite often, including himself. So I don't think it's fair to hold me to that standard as far
as employment goes if they're not going to hold everybody to it, you know, so.

JUDGE

What -

CLAIMANT

And the other reason I was told I was being let go is because I was too argumentative
with him, or didn't take his advice in the proper way, I guess, which I didn't see coming
because I felt like we had a pretty good relationship.

JUDGE

Okay. All right. Did all of the sales reps have the same work schedule. Mr. Davis?

CLAIMANT

Yes.

JUDGE

Did they all have the same work schedule?

CLAIMANT

I guess all the salespeople I assume did. I guess the (inaudible), but yeah I assume it like I said, I was under the understanding that it was suggested due to the prior contact
hours that you had to schedule appointments outside of. And - but I was there, you know,
over - over 40 hours a week every7 week and, you know, was there most of the time.

JUDGE

Okay. Now you said that it was a common practice for people to leave early. How
common was it that people left work earl}?

CLAIMANT

People came and went quite regularly, you know, kind of at their discretion, or lesser.
There was many times there was - you know, it was \ cry -1 would say - to answer the
question it was very regular, very common.

JUDGE

Okay. Had it always been common, or was this kind of just recently, or?

CLAIMANT

This is the second time I've been hired on by Prosper, and it was better - it was more
organized - or structured this time, I will agree to that.

JUDGE

Oka>.

CLAIMANT

But. yeah. No, it was a very common practice. You know, it was - it was talked about
throughout. You know, you saw it with -1 can't (inaudible) foi my own ^alidatIon of
every7 employee, but everyone on our team I can say at one point.

JUDGE

Okay. Now prior to this warning on April 12th had you ever received any warnings
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But we did talk about that after and it seemed to be a non-issue at that point.
JUDGE

Okay. All right. So when your supervisor wasn't there, did you normally just tell a
coworker if you needed to leave early?

CLAIMANT

Well, the practice was to communicate with him. You know, like >ou said - like he said
that he had a different schedule, so it was kind of like, you know, I guess you would send
him a text or you send him an email. And then - yeah, yeah, I always communicated with
people that were there -

JUDGE

Okay.

CLAIMANT

- (inaudible).

JUDGE

All right. Do you remember getting a copy of the attendance policy or an employer employee handbook at orientation?

CLAIMANT

I don't remember the attendance policy. But. you know, it was one day - it was a one day
thing for -1 mean, no, I don't remember. Your Honor.

JUDGE

Okay. So you - do you not remember whether or not you signed an acknowledgement?

CLAIMANT

I don't.

JUDGE

Okay. All right Let's go now to the Exhibit 9, your warning of April 12th. Mr. Brown
has testified that you had an appointment with a client at 9:00 a.m., and you missed the
appointment and called - I'm sorry, he called you at 11:30. Can you recall any of the
circumstances around that event on April 12th?

CLAIMANT

Yeah. I was carpooling, I think I addressed, with another employee. And that
appointment that was at 9:00 a.m., w as actually on my calendar from the day before, and
I had actually scheduled that when I got into the office. It wasn't like I missed it and
nothing happened. I did take responsibility to make sure - they ended up not - you know,
it was a - we had consultations and then we had times to set up to call people.
And this happened to be one of those times that I set up to try and call this person for the
first time. It wasn't a real set appointment that was going to led to like to, you know, a
possible revenue for the company. I mean, it was -1 ended up talking to the person, but it
was on my calendar as a first call appointment versus what he was saying that it was a
consultation type appointment. Which doesn't quite make any sense to me, but it wasn't it was something that I was handled when I got in there.

JUDGE

Okay. And why were you late to work that day?
26
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

AUD&PiWm

JUDGE

Okay. And did he tell you that you needed to adhere to the schedule?

CLAIMANT

And again, the way the schedule was presented to me was this is something that another
team had been trying and these are the hours that we'd like you to work; the highest
contact hours. It wasn't - you know, I mean, I was there most of the time anyway; and if I
wasn't, I worked longer hours. But I wasn't under any understanding that it was a set
schedule because of our commission structure type job.

JUDGE

Okay. Mr. Davis, do you believe that - do you think there were any other reasons for
your discharge, other than your not adhering to the schedule?

CLAIMANT

Yes.

JUDGE
CLAIMANT

Why don't you tell me why you think you were discharged?
I mean, I think that our team as whole was not very productive at the time and hadn't
been for a while. And, you know, I had spoke to Mr. Brown that, you know, I, you
know, for Prosper and for me, if I couldn't make this work pretty soon that it wasn't going
to make sense for me, you know, needing a, you know, higher paying job. And, you
know, the reason - I'd been hired there before and came back because I had made good
money and I was. you know, felt like I was putting in even more effort and it just wasn't
happening.
And, you know, it was like that for a lot of people on my team, but it just - there was a.
you know, (inaudible) on our team and the floor as a whole, and I think they were just,
you know, leaning towards for whatever reason. I mean, I wasn't -1 definitely would say
that I was probably more outspoken, I guess, maybe more -1 don't know exactly why. I
mean, it really maybe they just used me to - maybe I was kind of not happy here, and it
had been addressed. And I think -1 think it had something to do with it. But really, to be
honest with you, quite shocked at the time that it happened for, you know, the reasons
that I was told that it was - this agree - this agreement with Mr. Brown - or that I was -1
think his words were aggressive in feedback to him when, yrou know, I thought like wre
had a pretty decent relationship and I tried to help out in any way I could. So I just really
don't -

JUDGE

Did he bring that thing - did he bring that up at your final meeting, your discharge
meeting that you were -

CLAIMANT

Yeah, I -

JUDGE

- (inaudible) or gave aggressive feedback?

CLAIMANT

Weil, I think it was - oh, I'm not exactly the verbiage that he used. It was just that I was
like, I can't remember exactly what it - what he said, but it was just that I -1 don't know,
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talked aggressively. I can't -1 don't really know the exact words. But, yeah, that I didn't
handle his feedback or, I don't know, constructive criticism very well. It was something
like that. I can't remember exactly what it was. It was something to that effect.
JUDGE

Okay. Now you started a sentence a minute ago and I'm not sure that I got the end of it.
You said you had talked to your supervisor and said that if I couldn't make it work, what?

CLAIMANT

Well, when I talked I, you know, talked to Mr. Brown and the other floor managers.
Kind of figured out what I proved myself, you know. I told him that, you know, well I
(inaudible) that I, you know, if I could start making - just figure out to make this work,
but it wasn't going to make sense for me economically. So I really wanted to try and, you
know, figure out what I could do to make that work.

JUDGE

Oh, okay, thank you. Did he give you any suggestions about what you could do to make
it more sense economicallv?

CLAIMANT

Well, he told me that, you know, and you can ask him, I mean, he's - you know, I'm an
educated person. He said that I found a (inaudible) a lot of room that I could improve. I
talked quite fast, I guess, is what he said. Maybe I could slow it down a little bit. But he
really just, you know, just there was a lot of suggestions for me as far as improvement.
That (inaudible) listen to it, I think he (inaudible) listen to some other people.

JUDGE

Okay. Do you recall - I'm sorry I'm jumping around a little bit. I'm going back through
my notes seeing if I've missed anything. On the May 11th, when you arrived at 1:05 and
you were supposed to arrive at 11:30, you indicated to your supervisor that there had
been some car problems; was that your car or your car pooling car, or what was the
situation that day?

CLAIMANT

No, that was just my car. I wasn't able to -1 can't remember exactly what the reason for
why it wouldn't start, but I had to -1 took it in to a friend of mine who helped me get it
going again so I could go into work, but it was -

JUDGE

Okay. All right I don't have any other questions for you, Mr. Davis. Well, yes, I do.
On Exhibit 9?

CLAIMANT

Yes.

JUDGE

There's just a typed comment there under the little box that saj s expected performance
improvements; under that box it sa>s consequences for failure to improve may result in
disciplinary action up to and including termination. Did you believe that your job was in
jeopardy at that point?

CLAIMANT

Not at all.
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JUDGE

Okay, Prior to your discharge, at any point did you feel like you were in danger of being
discharged?

CLAIMANT

The discharge came to me as quite a shock, I mean. You know, at that time, you know,
like I said, I worked all day, but talked -1 just had a sit down with Mr. Brown and the
floor manager talking to them about things to improve, you know, certain things to help
the team out and stuff like that. And we were working, I thought, towards more positive
outcome. So, yeah, I think it was complete surprising.

JUDGE

Okay. All right. Thank you, Mr. Davis. Is there anything else you want to tell me about
your discharge?

CLAIMANT

No, I think (hat's it. Your Honor.

JUDGE

Okay. Mr. Anderson, would you like to ask Mr. Davis some questions?

ANDERSON

I do, Your Honor.

JUDGE
ANDERSON

Uh-huh, go ahead, please.
Mr. Davis, you said the people regularly came and went and, you know, at various hours;
do you have any evidence, other than your testimony, to support that?

CLAIMANT

I don't have any documentation. I could, you know -

ANDERSON

Okay. Let me ask you dais. Do you know if a person left early or late, do you have
personal knowledge whether they had communicated with Mr. Brown and had
permission to do so?

CLAIMANT

Yeah, I do.

ANDERSON

So in each case that the person left early, you would know that they've talked to Mr.
Brown or not?

CLAIMANT

You just changed what you said. You asked me if I knew of anybody that did that, and
then in each case. I didn't know even' time somebody left. no.

ANDERSON

Well, I'm trying to - I'm trying to drill down on your testimony. When you said the
people regularly -

CLAIMANT

Okay.

ANDERSON

- came and went -

>
r

\
)
)

[
)
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CLAIMANT

Right.

ANDERSON

- do you know whether they had permission to do so?

CLAIMANT

Everybody in the company? No, I didn't have -1 didn't ask everybody, no.

ANDERSON

How about those that were supervised by Mr. Brown?

CLAIMANT

A lot of them are very close friends of mine and I did know whether or not they had - not
every time, like you suggested. But there were times that I know that they didn't.

ANDERSON

So is it your testimony that you do not know whether they had talked to Mr. Brown or
not?

CLAIMANT

No, that's not what I said. I said there were times I know they did not. I don't know
about every time whether they did so or not.

ANDERSON

Okay. I think we keep going around in a circle. Let me see if I can rephrase it. Your
testimony was that people came and went regularly?

CLAIMANT

Right.

ANDERSON

Based on your testimony do you know if a person came or went whether they had talked
to Mr. Brown or not?

CLAIMANT

Okay. The reason that we're having trouble is you keep changing the question. I don't
know everybody's per - like every situation, if that's what you're trying to say. If you're
asking whether or not there were instances where I knew that they had not. there were. I
don't know every one, though.

ANDERSON

Lei me ask you a question. If I can draw your attention to Exhibit 10? Exhibit 10 says,
according to on Tuesday, May 11th, you came in at 1:06 p.m., which is corroborating by
Exhibit 8. However, it also looks like you checked out at 3:03, having a total of two
hours and 40 minutes; is that correct?

CLAIMANT

Like I said, I didn't find this and it was when - before I left. I didn't even have a chance
to go over my hours specifically. So I would have to say I don't believe that would have
been the case, or it would have been addressed. So I don't - there's a lot of times that there time issues all (he time with the - the clock on the schedules that you - when we
were presented these things, we changed them on a regular basis because of the clock in
and clock out.

ANDERSON

That does not answer the question.
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XAIMANT

I - yeah, I guess so. That's not what it was under my knowledge but, yeah.

ANDERSON

Well, but according to that, then on all three of those days you left work early?

XAIMANT

Well, if you'll look there on the hours, I mean I - it must have -

ANDERSON

Just answer the question. According to die schedule that you were given as written on
the warning of Exhibit 9 on April 12th, it said that you were to work until 8:00?

CLAIMANT

Right. Well, I'm just -

ANDERSON

(Inaudible) date it appears that you did not work until 8:00; is that your recollection that
you, in fact, left early in -

CLAIMANT

I-

ANDERSON

- contradiction of the stated policy?

CLAIMANT

Okay, I'm just going to tell you. I know what you're trying to get at. But the thing is, my
whole point of this is we communicated our schedules with our team leader, and that's
why I don't - I'm saying that we weren't held to that schedule. I still worked nine hours
and almost eight hours on the next day. So I -1 know that I had other things and other
appointments that were going on that kept me from taking a break during the day like
other people did, that made it so I was able to leave early and still maintain my over
eight-hour requirement.

ANDERSON

Well, is it your testimony that you could effectively scheduled - set your own schedule?

CLAIMANT

We were required to schedule our own appointments, yes.

ANDERSON

I didn't ask about appointments. I asked were you able to set your own schedule?

CLAIMANT

To some degrees we were.

ANDERSON

So is it jour testimony that the written warning on Exhibit 9 where it specifically told you
the hours to work, that that - even though it is a written warning, it really didn't apply to
you?

CLAIMANT

I don't appreciate the attacks here. I didn't -1 never said it didn't apply to me. What I was
trying to say, and I'll try" to very clearly and see if- see if we can make sense of this, how
it - our schedules worked, there was recommended schedules. Sometimes you had
people that were at 9:00 on the West Coast. And so when you did that, you're able to
work different hours because they didn't want you working a lot of overtime, okay? So I
wasn't thinking I was unique. I was working within the parameters of the schedule still
33
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doing my job to my best ability.

l
2

And what happened on those days as far as what I had scheduled and what was going on
as far as, you know, the appointments and everything that was going on with that, the
actual things that required me to do my job I was doing obviously. So pretty -1 know
you're trying - you're trying to get at that I think that I didn't have to adhere to the
schedule. That's not true. We worked within these parameters. And the whole company
worked as - 1 mean you talked to somebody and you would work, you know, around
certain schedules to try to get people in when you can, because you had your schedule fill
up and then you had to work around that to get other people. And then I'd - you know, I'd
be there until 11:00 on a Friday niglil sometimes. You know, it's just kind of how it
worked.
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ANDERSON

If I can draw jour attention to the middle of Exhibit 9, it says work scheduled shift, and it
gives specific hours; were you told to work those hours?

CLAIMANT

I think I've addressed this. I told you there was a suggested schedule, which if you only
work those hours and somebody wanted to meet outside of those hours, yeah, we did - we
were allowed to do that. And you know, they didn't want us working more than 40 hours
a week. I don't know how much more clear I can make this. That was a recommended
schedule. But as a commission job working with people, setting appointments based on
what their schedules were, sometimes you had to make, you know, changes to your
schedule so you could fit it to theirs, and that was okay.

ANDERSON

Let me ask you, did Mr. Brown tell you at the time of separation that you were being
terminated for your attendance?

CLAIMANT

No, not for my attendance. Lack of communication he said.

ANDERSON

So it's now your testimony that >ou were not told that because you were unable to keep
the schedule that you were let go?

CLAIMANT

Excuse me? I'm not sure if I understand what jou're trying to get at.

ANDERSON

You have a written w arning in April and you were discharged in May because you were
not keeping the schedule. If you're not keeping the schedule, isn't that an attendance
problem?

CLAIMANT

You asked me what was said in the meeting of why I was discharged. Thai was not what
the reason was.

ANDERSON

My recollection was that you said that one of the reasons you were told you were being
terminated, one was for your attendance, and two because they thought that jou had an
attitude or, you know7, you didn't take criticism. If 34
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CLAIMANT

No.

ANDERSON

- Fm not understanding your testimony correcti>, can you please state the specific -

CLAMANT

Okay.

ANDERSON

- reasons you were told that you were being terminated?

CLAIMANT

Okay. And, yeah, 111 tell you exactly. And you know, your -1 don't know, you're trying
to attack me on things and twist words around, which I didn't say. And let me just tell
you very clearly, it was like the lack of communication Mr. Brown said to me, and that that was not -1 didn't say specifically it was because of my attendance. It was because and through this whole conversation the main addressed points were that there was
communication or there's, you know, things that kept me from getting into work on time.
But it wasn't an attendance issue primarily, no.

ANDERSON

So if there's a lack of communication, and Fm not trying to put words in your mouth; Fm
trying to understand. If you're told that there's a lack of communication because you're
not into work at time, it's your testimony that that is not an attendance problem?

JUDGE

Okay. Maybe I can shed some light on this. I was taking pretty careful notes when Mr.
Davis provided his earlier testimony. When I asked him what reasons were you given for
your discharge, he said there were two. Number one, he didn't know where I went at
5:00. He went on to say but he wasn't even there. He said it was a common practice
among all, even supervisors.
Number two, he said Fm too argumentative. I didn't take advice properly. Later on he
said something about he was a little aggressive and didn't give proper feedback. So he
didn't, as far as my notes show, Mr. Davis did not say attendance was one of the reasons
for his discharge.

CLAIMANT

Thank you.

JUDGE

Of course Fm going to go back and review the record but, Mr. Anderson, I think Mr.
Davis is right when he told me the reasons for his discharge he did not say that
attendance was one of the problems.

ANDERSON

That's fine, Your Honor. I guess we understand the testimony a little different. Let me,
Mr. Davis, draw your attention to Exhibit 12.

CLAIMANT

Okay.

ANDERSON

In the middle of the page there's some questions and answers; are those your cmswers that
you provided to the Department when you tiled for unemployment?
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